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ABSTRACT
The relation among solidarity, religion, and the environment is a timely 
and pressing topic –  or cluster of related topics. It has become clear that 
religion plays a salient role in forging social solidarity and, in the process, 
of shaping cultural perspectives that pertain to politics, education, 
the economy, and the environment. In this article, I do the following: 
(1) I argue that religion and solidarity should not be treated as anomalies 
in modernity, and that both religion and solidarity continue to play 
a significant role in local and global events; social solidarity in particular 
remains an essential condition for addressing many challenges that 
confront the globe today, including social justice and environmental 
degradation. (2) Drawing mainly on the work of the social theorist, Emile 
Durkheim, I show the role solidarity plays in establishing freedom of 
conscience and individual rights (moral individualism), moral pluralism, 
moral education, economic justice, and political community; this 
broad discussion will constitute the greater part of this article. Finally, 
(3) I discuss the relation among religion, solidarity, and environmental 
degradation; I argue that religion and solidarity can provide important 
cultural resources to combat global trends that threaten the environment.
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1. Introduction: scope and qualifications
The relation among solidarity, religion, and the environment is a timely and 
pressing topic –  or cluster of related topics. Many of today’s pressing political 
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and social concerns are illuminated by an understanding of the religious beliefs and 
practices that lie beneath and within the news headlines. Whether one ventures 
into the religions of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, the Americas, and Europe, one 
sees how the formation and transmission of beliefs, behaviors, values, rituals, texts, 
institutions, and forms of community have a considerable influence on global and 
local events. In particular, it has become clear that religion plays a salient role in 
forging social solidarity and, in the process, of shaping cultural perspectives that 
pertain to politics, education, the economy, and the environment. In this article, I will 
do the following:
• I will argue that religion and solidarity should not be treated as anomalies in 
modernity, and that both religion and solidarity continue to play a significant role in 
local and global events; social solidarity in particular remains an essential condition 
for addressing many challenges that confront the globe today, including social 
justice and environmental degradation.
• Drawing mainly on the work of the social theorist, Emile Durkheim, I will 
show the role solidarity plays in establishing freedom of conscience and individual 
rights (moral individualism), moral pluralism, moral education, economic justice, and 
political community; this broad discussion will constitute the greater part of this 
article.
• Finally, I will discuss the relation among religion, solidarity, and environmental 
degradation; I will argue that religion and solidarity can provide important cultural 
resources to combat global trends that threaten the environment.
Before I turn to these sections, I wish to make a couple of qualifications. First, 
I need to make it clear that both religion and solidarity can act as double-edged 
swords. That is to say, religion can contribute to healthy social reform and wise 
environmental practices as well as to reactionary social oppression and rapacious 
environmental practices. And solidarity, for its part, can sustain efforts for peace, 
justice, and environmentalism, but it can also support militaristic agendas and 
oppressive social and environmental practices. In this article, I do not wish simply 
to celebrate religion and solidarity. Religion and solidarity assume a variety of socio-
historical forms, some admirable, some deplorable. But in either case, religion and 
solidarity are worthy of our attention, and they are necessary topics for a better 
understanding of the state of the social and physical environment today.
Finally, I wish to say something about the scope of this article. Although I will 
often allude to a variety of global developments, most of my references will be rooted 
in North Atlantic democratic social and intellectual traditions. It is in these traditions 
that I have been trained; it is in these traditions that my own normative, social vision 
has been shaped. Still, I hope and I believe that my claims in this article have broad 
implications for the world in which we all live.
2. Religion and modernity
It would be naïve and probably dangerous to fail to attend to the religious aspects 
of life together and life alone. The manner and language of religion –  so familiar in 
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society, so alien in the academy –  is gaining critical consideration. Scholars in the 
social sciences and in political and legal theory are turning their attention to the 
relation among religion, law, and politics. If our attention was once diverted from 
this triad, it was in part, due to what are now largely discredited theories about the 
inevitable march of secularization. There was an assumption that the world would 
increasingly abandon religion that the actual state of the world would come to match 
an ideal of the European Enlightenment, namely, an enlightened age free of strife, 
free of religion.
The assumption was doubly flawed. First, it was based on an erroneous 
interpretation of the Enlightenment as a monolithic force that discounted religion 
(as opposed, for example, to the Enlightenment itself having religious origins and 
objectives). And second, it was based on the view that modernity would necessarily 
usher in secularism, that is, an age in which religion had no significant standing. Yet 
sociologists and religious studies scholars, among others, have come to realize that 
religion as an intellectual, cultural, and political force is not, in fact, waning on the 
globe. Today, this realization should be clear to anyone even vaguely familiar with 
current events. Among the majority of the planet’s inhabitants, including those in 
North America, religion is thriving.
And by religion I do not here mean a broad, Durkheimian notion of religion –  that 
is, religion as any set of beliefs and practices that forge moral community. Don’t get 
me wrong: I like Durkheim, and later in this article I will rely heavily on Durkheim’s 
work. But here when I claim that religion is still very much alive, I mean religion as it 
is commonly understood, that is, such historical traditions as Hinduism, Buddhism, 
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. I would like to suggest that religion is alive not in 
spite of modernity, but rather because modernity and religion are not necessarily 
antagonistic. It is simply no longer useful to think of religion as an anomaly in the 
modern age. The same claim could be made of community, tradition, and solidarity. 
In other words, neither religion nor Gemeinschaft should no longer be considered 
a relic of a by-gone era.
3. Emile Durkheim, solidarity, and twenty-first century democracy in a global age
In this section, I consider the nature and place of solidarity in the work of Durkheim, 
and what lessons that work may hold for pluralistic, democratic societies at 
the outset of the twenty-first century. In particular, I explore Durkheim’s notion 
of solidarity in his work on moral individualism, democracy, pluralism, moral 
education, economic justice, and globalization. I look to Durkheim because 
I believe he can help us think critically about the obstacles we face in achieving 
a genuinely multiracial, multicultural democracy. Such an achievement, I believe, 
is the hope –  but thus far, not the reality –  of the democratic experiment that has 
been taking place in the U. S. This is an experiment that has global consequences, 
and hence it is worthy of our consideration. It is a worthy challenge to endeavor 
to fashion a democratic republic in which individual rights are protected and the 
public life is inclusive, lively, and just.
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Solidarity, I will soon argue, need not be construed as sameness or uniformity. 
Rather, it can be akin to what Cornel West has expressed using the metaphor of the 
jazz band. “The interplay of individuality and unanimity,” West declares, “is not one 
of uniformity and unanimity imposed from above but rather of conflict among diverse 
groupings that reach a dynamic consensus subject to questioning and criticism. 
As with a soloist in a jazz... band, individuality is promoted in order to sustain and 
increase the creative tension with the group –  a tension that yields higher levels of 
performance to achieve the aim of the collective project.” (West, 2001, pp. 150–151) 
Honoring both individual rights and common projects –  these twin poles, with all the 
tension between them –  mark Durkheim’s work, his vision, his challenge. And this 
may capture a challenge of democracy in the twenty-first century. My fundamental 
question of Durkheim, then, is this: How can he assist us in formulating a model of 
solidarity that includes and supports freedom of conscience and diversity? Also, how 
can his work help us envision paradigms of co-operation on such shared projects as 
eradicating racism, protecting the environment, and achieving social justice?
3.1 Durkheim and solidarity
We associate the concept of social solidarity with the life and thought of Durkheim, 
and for good reason. He was committed to it, both theoretically and practically. In 
The Elementary Forms of Religious Life ([1912] 2001), arguably his most important 
book, Durkheim set himself the task of discovering an enduring source of human 
social identity and fellowship –  solidarité. Durkheim treated religion, broadly 
understood, as dynamic social ideals, beliefs, and practices that shape a shared 
perception of, and therefore life in, a society’s moral universe. One finds religion 
wherever public, normative concepts, symbols, or rites are employed. Religion, in 
this view, is variously found in modern and in (what we once called) postmodern 
societies. The upshot of this, morally and epistemologically, is that human life is, 
in a significant sense, life together. This is Durkheim’s response, and challenge, to 
a long tradition of Cartesian and Spencerian individualistic thought.
Elementary Forms was Durkheim’s last book, but from the start of his career, 
the task of solidarity can be found: the task of understanding its various sources 
and forms, and of evaluating its appropriate shape or type for a society in light 
of sociohistorical circumstances. Durkheim’s own sociohistorical circumstances 
account, in part, for his life-long interest in and commitment to solidarity. As 
a French Jew raised in the warmth and security of a tightly knit Jewish community, 
David Émile Durkheim was early on exposed to the complex, often conflicting 
values of the Third Republic –  liberty, equality, and solidarity. It is not much of 
an exaggeration to say that every major subject Durkheim investigated became 
for him a lens through which to examine the nature and condition of solidarity in 
contemporary democratic society.
In Elementary Forms, for example, Durkheim claimed that totemism among the 
aborigines of Australia was not in itself his principal object of study. Rather, it was 
an avenue “to yield an understanding of the religious nature of man, by showing 
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us an essential and permanent aspect of humanity.” (Durkheim, 2001, p. 3) This 
“permanent aspect of humanity,” as it turns out, is the human need and capacity to 
relate socially. Another example: Durkheim’s sophisticated epistemology, or what is 
sometimes known as his sociology of knowledge, provided a way for philosophers 
and others to let go of the idea that reason is a transcendent, ahistorical faculty, yet 
without having to jettison all notions of objectivity. In Durkheim’s mind, his work 
on epistemology –  socializing the idealists and the empiricists –  was especially 
significant insofar as it contributed to the view that there can be no radically private 
human existence. To exist in a world is to understand that world, and understanding 
is comprised of shared, collective representations. This is not only an empirical 
description of human cognition, but is also a normative position, for it challenges 
the atomistic assumptions of a methodological individualism that Durkheim found 
morally unacceptable. Epistemology, then, permitted Durkheim to feature once 
again the profoundly social nature of humankind.
Even Durkheim’s investigations of modern individualism became a vehicle to 
explore social solidarity. Durkheim made the surprising claim that there is a form of 
contemporary individualism, what he called moral individualism that emerges from 
the solidarity that marks North Atlantic democracies. Think of moral individualism 
as a cluster of dynamic beliefs and practices, symbols and institutions that support 
the dignity and rights of the individual. This modern cult of the individual has all the 
attributes of traditional religion. It possesses robust, sacred symbols that express 
collective sentiments; it reaffirms and protects itself by means of both positive and 
negative rites, for example, public celebrations of defenders of individual rights or the 
prosecution of those who would violate such rights. Commitment to the rights and 
dignity of the individual is a principal thread, Durkheim argued, in the moral fabric that 
weaves together the diverse citizens of a modern democracy. It provides the shared 
moral identity of “we, the people.” Moral individualism –  as opposed to atomistic or 
utilitarian individualism –  became for Durkheim an answer to the question: What can 
provide the basis of a common good in the democratic societies of his day?
The important task before me is to consider whether Durkheim’s work on 
solidarity is still germane for reflection on present-day democratic societies – 
especially democracies marked by pluralism, multiculturalism, and globalization. My 
challenge is not to defend Durkheim’s work –  I am not dedicated to him –  but rather 
to investigate his relevance for what I am dedicated to: robust, just, and inclusive 
democracies in an age of diversity and globalization.
3.2 Solidarity held in suspicion
Solidarity is a concept widely held in suspicion today and often for good reason. 
On epistemological grounds, many doubt that there is a shared, universal human 
nature that could provide common ground among diverse human communities and 
individuals. And when solidarity does seem to emerge, it is often interpreted as either 
a contingent confluence of individuals with a shared cultural or ethnic inheritance, or 
an enforced uniformity that merely gives the impression of solidarity. In this latter 
Mark S. Cladis358
view, solidarity is a form of imperialism or colonialism. Alien norms, practices, and 
symbols of identity are imposed by the powerful on those lacking power. Solidarity 
turns out to be hegemony. Debates in the U.S. over multiculturalism, diversity, and 
what have come to be known as “cultural wars” have focused our attention on many 
insidious practices carried out in the name of solidarity. Yet these debates also have 
had the unintended consequence of leading us to think, once again, about the social 
significance and merit of solidarity. As we wrestled with the importance of respecting 
“difference,” we also asked about the shared context in which these debates took 
place. Who is the “we” engaged in these contests and disputes? Focusing on 
difference led to discussions about the possibility of common ground or solidarity. 
Moreover, as the language of human rights increasingly became something of 
a shared –  though vague –  global vocabulary, many social activists began speaking 
of a global or world solidarity centered on such goals as eradicating torture, hunger, 
racism, and the exploitation of women and children. Solidarity, today, is a contested 
concept. But this much is clear: solidarity is not simply a quaint term unworthy of our 
consideration. For better for worse, it remains a powerful notion. To think otherwise 
borders on self-deception.
Recent debates over the role and significance of solidarity are not without 
precedent. When Durkheim championed the need for solidarity and strategies to 
enhance it, he was addressing the entire French republic, but especially his fellow 
intellectuals, socialists, and other progressive peers. Solidarity, in Durkheim’s vision, 
was to embrace all citizens, but it was based on a particular –  far from neutral –  set 
of goals and ideals: the protection and extension of human rights; an economy 
accountable to human welfare (as opposed to the maximization of profit); the 
freedom of critical inquiry; and a secular state that respected yet was not based 
on religion. Not long after Durkheim’s death, however, his work was placed in 
a conservative canon of sociologists who, motivated by a nostalgic sense of by-gone 
days of community and uniformity, advanced solidarity for the sake of social control 
and order. It was Durkheim’s commitment to solidarity, along with his historicist 
approach, that placed him in this conservative legacy.
This regrettable placement continues to distort our view of Durkheim’s 
fundamental commitments and goals. Durkheim investigated the webs and patterns 
of social order for the sake of establishing social justice. Many have attributed 
conservatism to Durkheim because of his commitment to viewing humans and 
their moral principles and practices as ineluctably rooted in their social milieus. The 
logic here goes something like this: social theorists who begin and end with human 
situatedness can never rise above present or past social ideals, customs, and 
institutions. These allegedly conservative theorists are bound to the stagnant status 
quo. Yet Durkheim’s sensitivity to the historical, far from tying him to a status quo, 
exposed him to social change and diversity. That exposure helped him to envision 
progressive social change, and also to recognize the fragility of many cultural and 
legal accomplishments. The rights and dignity of the individual, for Durkheim, are 
important pieces of moral, social progress. They are not, however, immutable. They 
are subject to immoral threats as well as to moral amelioration. Durkheim maintained 
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that moral progress requires a social solidarity that is willing to wrestle with social 
problems and achieve social change. Human rights, for example, cannot be realized 
by the law or the courts alone, but rather they require shared social beliefs and 
practices that support the legal system.
The “fact of diversity,” then as Durkheim and Rawls roughly call it, need not 
entail moving beyond solidarity, as if solidarity and diversity were oppositional, 
or as if “justice for all” could be accomplished by leaving solidarity behind. The 
often-assumed incompatibility, then, between social diversity and social solidarity 
deserves to be examined. What is solidarity? What does it mean to live in a shared 
social and geographic setting? What are the basic requirements of social life? What 
are the social implications of our shared need for shelter, nutritious food, clean air 
and water, work, repose, and safety? What kind of social cooperation is needed for 
citizens to move about unencumbered, to have access to public transportation, to 
drive or walk in peace? What are the requirements for achieving such collective goals 
as economic justice, environmental practices, and the eradication of discrimination 
based on race, gender, or sexual orientation? Why should pluralism or globalization 
negate the need for cooperation in achieving basic, daily, shared human goods and 
future collective aims?
Durkheim affirmed that solidarity, in some form or forms, is all but inevitable for 
any society. The question for us, then, is not: “Solidarity –  should we have it?” The 
question is, “What kind of solidarity –  or solidarities –  do we already have, and what 
kind should we have?” My own view is that an appropriate form of solidarity for 
democratic, political communities must not only tolerate diversity but also celebrate 
diversity as a precious public resource. Solidarity, in Durkheim’s account, embraced 
all citizens, but it was based on a particular –  far from neutral –  set of democratic 
ideals, beliefs, and practices, including: the protection and extension of human 
rights; an economy accountable to human welfare (as opposed to the maximization 
of profit); the freedom of critical inquiry and reform; and a secular state that respected 
yet did not privilege religion.
3.3 Moral individualism, pluralism, and education
In 1835 Tocqueville wrote, “individualism is a word recently coined to express 
a new idea. Our fathers only knew about egoism” (Tocqueville, 1969, p. 506). This 
provocative claim about “a new idea” is not entirely correct (think of the celebration 
of “individualism” in Montaigne’s Essays or Rousseau’s Reveries of the Solitary 
Walker). Moreover, it was not the case that everyone in Tocqueville’s age would 
have agreed that there are forms of individualism that are not synonymous with 
egoism. Even in Durkheim’s age –  and still today –  some identified individualism with 
egoism. “Individualism is the great sickness of the present time... Each of us has 
confidence only in himself, sets himself up as the sovereign judge of everything...” 
This quotation is not from MacIntyre’s After Virtue but from Ferdinand Brunetière’s 
“After the Trial,” which appeared in the Revue des deux mondes (Brunetière, 1898, 
p. 445). Brunetière, a Catholic literary historian and critic, denounced individualism 
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and claimed that it was debilitating France’s moral foundation and solidarity. It is 
the “intellectuals” who carry this disease, and if they are not checked, he warned, 
traditional virtue and values will wither as moral relativism and hedonism spread. 
In the same year, Durkheim published a response entitled “Individualism and the 
Intellectuals.” In it, Durkheim discussed “the argument, always refuted and always 
renewed,” that “intellectual and moral anarchy would be the inevitable result 
of liberalism” (Durkheim, 1973, p. 49). Some varieties of liberalism, Durkheim 
conceded, are egoistic and threaten the common good of societies by encouraging 
the individual to become excessively consumerist and preoccupied with narrow self-
interest. But there is a strand of liberalism, Durkheim argued, which is moral and 
social. This strand, I noted, Durkheim called moral individualism, and he claimed that 
“not only is [moral] individualism not anarchical, but it henceforth is the only system 
of beliefs which can ensure the moral unity of the country.” (Ibid., p. 50) In liberal, 
democratic nations such as France, the people’s character and their solidarity are 
promoted by the liberal practices and ideals of moral individualism.
This turns out to be a surprising and powerful defense of democratic liberalism. 
Durkheim did not appeal to universal principles derived from natural reason or from 
any other tap into an “objective,” ahistorical moral reality. He situated his defense 
in history, specifically French history. France’s modern, moral traditions, Durkheim 
argued, are largely constituted by liberal, pluralistic institutions and values that 
protect the rights and dignity of the individual. To neglect these traditions is to court 
moral anarchy. It is Brunetière then, the conservative who speaks of “solidarity 
above all” who, according to Durkheim, threatens the moral fabric of society.
This argument, like most of Durkheim’s work, belongs to a distinctive French 
narrative, a narrative of struggle and accomplishment, of the Revolution and the 
Constitution. His arguments are not for all societies, even if they can be applied to 
many –  certainly to our own. Mostly, however, his is an insider’s argument: written 
for the French, by a Jewish Frenchman. Durkheim provided a distinctive reading 
of Rousseau and Kant, among others, attempting to locate them in a republican 
tradition that describes rights and duties as the result of a commitment to public, not 
only private, concerns. He worked to piece together his own account of his favorite 
varieties of liberalism (as well as offering complex criticisms of his least favorite 
forms of liberalism, for example, of what he called economic individualism and crass 
utilitarianism). This was no invention from scratch. a set of liberal, democratic traditions 
already existed. But Durkheim was well aware of competing liberal traditions, such 
as those of the classical economists and utilitarians, as well as competing solidarity 
traditions, such as those of the Royalists and the conservative Roman Catholics. 
Durkheim wanted to establish the authority of moral individualism by arguing that 
it, in fact, represented France’s most morally progressive and legitimate traditions.
We can think of moral individualism as having two components. Moral 
individualism is characterized by (1) a set of social beliefs and practices that 
constitute a pervasive shared understanding, which supports the rights, and dignity 
of the individual; and (2) a plurality of social spheres that permits diversity and 
individual autonomy, and furnishes beliefs and practices, which morally associate 
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individuals occupying a particular sphere. The first component, briefly mentioned 
and then rejected in The Division of Labor (1893) was developed in the Dreyfusard 
article, “Individualism and the Intellectuals,” after having been initially proposed in 
Suicide ([1897] 1951) the preceding year. The second component was explored in 
The Division of Labor and later enhanced in Suicide and especially in Durkheim’s 
lectures published as Professional Ethics and Civic Morals ([first French edition, 
1950, published posthumously] 1992) –  lectures written around the same time as the 
Dreyfusard article.
A robust social defense of democratic liberalism requires both components. 
The first element ensures that a diverse citizenry cares for a common political 
community that is sustained by, among other things, beliefs pertaining to the 
sanctity of the individual. The second element ensures that as individuals pursue 
their rights, they reside within a multitude of relatively distinct and protected social 
spheres that provide shared meanings and identities. We can label this second 
component as Durkheim’s understanding of moral pluralism and a plurality of 
morals, especially as described in Professional Ethics and Civic Morals. a plurality 
of morals refers to the diverse sets of goals and values, and the varying levels of 
homogeneity that characterize groups in the domestic, occupational, civic, and 
international spheres. Moral pluralism, in contrast, pertains to the relation between 
the beliefs and practices of the political community and the beliefs and practices 
of such associations or groups as churches and synagogues, ethnic organizations 
and activist alliances. This can include associations that can be said to rest upon 
comprehensive religious, moral, or philosophical doctrines. The solidarity of 
the political community, in Durkheim’s view, does not require broad agreement 
from these associations on every issue. Social solidarity, in other words, does 
not require social homogeneity. On some issues, however, such as the protection 
of diversity, widespread agreement is desirable. Moral pluralism, then, refers to 
a plurality of communities and associations that promote distinctive practices and 
beliefs, and yet also contribute to –  or at least do not threaten –  common public 
projects and goals.
Think of Durkheim’s moral pluralism as standing in opposition to three 
models of society: society as (1) a group of disparate individuals; (2) a group of 
disparate, morally self-sustaining, homogeneous communities divorced from the 
larger political community; and (3) a single, national, homogeneous community. 
The moral pluralism that Durkheim envisioned captures the merits and avoids the 
limits of the three models. It sustains a multitude of diverse communities (model 
two), all sharing a common, albeit limited, set of obligations and goals (model 
three), including individual and group rights and liberties (model one). Durkheim 
would have agreed with progressive communitarians that human association is 
a social good that is necessary for well-being. With progressive liberals, however, 
he also would have agreed that no one community, including the political one, 
has a monopoly on virtue or the good life. Happiness and an ethical life are not 
contingent on participation in any single, privileged community, but are procurable 
in a variety of spheres and groups.
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Nonetheless, moral pluralism, as Durkheim conceived it, does support the 
solidarity of a shared political community, a community that encompasses all others. 
This social realm aims for inclusion and open critical reflection. At times, the most 
salient thing that needs to be agreed on may be what needs to be discussed. We 
can agree on the need to debate such pressing issues as how to pursue economic 
justice and environmental safeguards, balanced budgets and social services, 
citizens’ security and global peace. Potential agreement rests on the fact that diverse 
citizens share a common history and future, and often care about the problems and 
promises that are germane, not only to a particular community, but to the broader 
community in which all participate. No secondary group should attempt to block its 
members from taking part in this wider life of common pursuits.
One of the best –  and most misunderstood –  examples of Durkheim’s capacity 
to connect social solidarity with pluralism and conflict is his work on moral education 
(Durkheim, 1956–1961). Its heterogeneous character, embracing critical thought and 
shared traditions, autonomy and community, human diversity and social solidarity, 
offers a nuanced description of and challenge to liberal, democratic institutions. 
Durkheim championed various perspectives of society’s shared understanding as 
a means to cultivate students’ dispositions for critical thinking. Critical thought and 
the stories a people tells about itself go hand in hand, in Durkheim’s view, because 
social critics, faced with changing circumstances, draw deeply from their social 
inheritances as they forge new paths and criticize old ones.
Durkheim held that future citizens of democracies need to know about styles 
of belief and practices other than those of the family or local group. He emphasized 
the need to accustom students to the unfamiliar in order that they can appreciate 
otherness and to identify the stranger as a fellow human. The study of history and 
literature are especially helpful in developing democratic skills and virtues, according 
to Durkheim. Studying history, for example, enables students to have an appreciation 
for the rich complexity of social life, and to develop a critical understanding of their 
own society’s place in history. The study of history promotes critical thinking because 
it both discloses to students their society’s distinctive shared understandings and 
exposes them to unfamiliar ways of life. Accustoming students to the unfamiliar 
enables them to value diversity and “the richness of life,” and to acquire novel ways 
to cope with suffering.
History, then, plays a critical role in moral education:
It is by learning to become familiar with other ideas, other customs, other 
manners, other political constitutions, other domestic organizations, other 
moralities and logics than those which he is used to that the student will gain 
a sense of the richness of life within the bounds of human nature. It is, therefore, 
only by history that we can give an account of the infinite diversity of the aspects 
which human nature can take on. (Durkheim, 1938, pp. 208–209)
Awareness of such pluralism is an essential aspect of moral education, because 
it thwarts the desire to designate a parochial moral vision as universal and then 
Changing Societies & Personalities, 2017       Vol. 1, No. 4 363
impose it on all humanity. Literature also figured importantly in Durkheim’s approach 
to moral education, and for many of the same reasons. General and abstract talk 
about the practices and hopes of a people will not make a vivid impression on 
students. Thick descriptions are required, and literature can deliver these. The detail 
found in literature allows the student “to touch [the manners, ideas, and institutions 
of a people] with his own hands,” to “see them alive.” (Durkheim, 1977, p. 332)
Moral education, then, in Durkheim’s view, takes place at the junctures of 
the familiar and the unfamiliar, the past and the present. Schools are to foster in 
students the capacity to evaluate contemporary practices in light of alternatives 
found in foreign or past cultures, in new developments taking place within 
contemporary society, and in longstanding ideals that need to be more fully 
realized in social practices.
3.4 Economic justice, the political community, and globalization
I have rehearsed Durkheim’s notion of moral individualism and moral pluralism, 
for these concepts are foundational for grasping Durkheim’s basic position on 
solidarity and diversity. Further, I focused on his complex approach to moral 
education as an example of how he combined his commitment to both solidarity 
and diversity. I now wish to explore briefly how this pair of commitments informs his 
substantive positions on economic justice; the relation between secondary groups 
and the state; and globalization. My chief question of Durkheim, however, remains 
the same: Can he assist us in formulating a model of solidarity that acknowledges 
pluralism and globalization?
Durkheim’s commitment to enhancing social solidarity was fueled, perhaps 
above all, by his worry over a private economy that put the maximization of profit 
above human social welfare. His multifaceted study on professional and civic ethics 
was motivated by his belief that economic institutions should be accountable to 
a society’s civic life –  at both the regional and national level. His worry was that as 
modern societies become increasingly individualistic, shared aims lack the strength 
to guide the economic life in light of prevailing conceptions of justice. So he imagined 
ways to broaden or extend democratic practices that could bring a moral influence 
to the economic life. This move is entirely consistent with Durkheim’s belief that 
there are moral dimensions to our shared civic life. The economy, in his view, should 
not be understood as a discrete, amoral, private realm, but rather as an integral 
moral component of the public life. Hence, in Durkheim’s lectures on professional 
ethics and civic morals, he concentrated on the economic sphere, for he believed 
that “the greater part of its existence is passed divorced from any moral influence.” 
(Durkheim, 1992, p. 12) The classical economists, Durkheim claimed, failed to see 
that “economic functions are not an end in themselves but only a means to an 
end; that they are one of the organs of social life and that social life is above all 
a harmonious community of endeavors.” (Durkheim, 1992, p. 16)
To make matters worse, the ethos of the economic sphere, marked by individual 
and corporate egoism, threatened to dominate other social spheres: “This amoral 
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character of economic life amounts to a public danger.” (Ibid., p. 12) Durkheim’s fear 
was that, due to the prominence of the economic sphere in modern societies, its 
amoral character would spread to other spheres.
How did Durkheim account for this “moral vacuum” in the economic sphere? 
Social institutions, given their historical character, change. “For two centuries,” 
Durkheim claimed, “economic life has taken on an expansion it never knew before.” 
(Ibid., p. 11) While this sphere grew and began to dominate society, a new “ethic” 
emerged that sought to deliver society from the traditional regulation of popes 
and monarchs and guilds. These old monitors were to be replaced by a new, 
impartial one: the guiding hand of the spontaneous market. Durkheim, however, 
considered this spontaneous regulation as essentially no regulation. In Suicide, 
for example, he stated that “for a whole century, economic progress has mainly 
consisted in freeing industrial relations from all regulation... and government, 
instead of regulating economic life, has become its tool and servant.” (Durkheim, 
1951, pp. 254–255)
In his lectures on professional ethics and civic morals, while discussing the 
economic world, which seems to lie “outside the sphere of morals,” Durkheim asked,
Is this state of affairs a normal one? It has had the support of famous doctrines. 
To start with, there is the classical economic theory according to which the 
free play of economic agreements should adjust itself and reach stability 
automatically, without it being necessary or even possible to submit it to any 
restraining forces. (Durkheim, 1992, p. 10)
Yet Durkheim went on to note that a stable and just economic sphere “cannot 
follow of itself from entirely material causes, from any blind mechanism, however 
scientific it may be. It is a moral task.” (Ibid., p. 12) Why a moral task? Because we 
should not expect just economic social practices to emerge spontaneously from 
private contracts or “supply and demand” or from any other liberal market devices. 
a moral task is at hand because people must do something to bring peace and 
justice to the economic sphere. Human effort and planning are required, but this in 
turn depends on some sense of shared purpose and common aims.
I will not discuss at length the most famous of Durkheim’s solutions to the moral 
bankruptcy of the economic sphere, namely, his call for the formation of occupational 
groups –  a new democratic space located between private lives and large, civic 
institutions. I do want to comment on, however, the premise of Durkheim’s hope for 
the establishment of occupational groups. His premise was that ethical practices 
are a product of human association; that practical moral reasoning emerges from 
working together, from shared practices. Workers, isolated from each other and 
from the shared purposes of their work, cannot create for themselves a healthy 
working environment, for example, fashioning practices pertaining to workers’ 
dignity, treatment, and fair compensation. Durkheim’s solution was to infuse the 
economic sphere with moral principles internal to the various, particular activities of 
the various occupations –  whether they be farming, banking, or factory work. The role 
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of occupational groups, then, is to provide moral connections between vocational 
practices and the internal goods and external goods relevant to them.
In order that external goods support –  as opposed to vitiate –  internal goods, 
various economic activities that a Spencerian would call private would need 
to be viewed in a more public light. First, the workers involved in a particular 
occupation would have a greater voice concerning its just operations. Second, 
the economic sphere in general would no longer been seen as a radically private 
one but as a realm subject to the political community. This is not necessarily 
a call for socialism. But it is Durkheim’s warning that moral economic practices 
will not develop under the present conditions of a Spencerian free market.
From one perspective, occupational groups are centers of moral life, which, 
although bound together, are distinct and relatively autonomous. In order that moral 
principles internal to each group emerge, the groups should, as Durkheim noted, 
“develop original characteristics.” Together these groups form the economic sphere. 
From another perspective, however, these groups are tributaries fed by shared 
traditions and institutions, by common projects and interests, by social solidarity. 
This latter perspective needs mentioning lest we lose sight of Durkheim’s conviction 
that the economic sphere needs to be accountable to the wider political community.
Without a sense of ourselves as a people with shared perspectives, problems, 
and goals, we will not be able to tackle such a pressing and massive problem as 
an economic sphere unaccountable to democratic institutions. Durkheim himself 
was not sanguine about the emergence of morally sustaining spheres of economic 
justice. He often wrote as if liberal society is taking on the character of a Hobbesian 
war of all against all. At such moments, he seemed to doubt the possibility of 
robust shared commitments and aims. This pessimism, however, did not lead to 
moral paralysis but to increased commitment to the tasks at hand.
There is a social sphere, Durkheim tells us, which is greater in scope than the 
various secondary groups. It is the political community. Inquiry into the nature of 
this sphere and its relation to other social spheres and to the state is necessary for 
an intelligent reading of Durkheim’s notion of a plurality of social spheres that are 
nourished by solidarity. If, for example, the domestic or the economic spheres are 
entirely independent of the political one, or even dominate it that might suggest 
a precarious laissez-faire pluralism that could lead to a society’s domination by 
a single sphere. On the other hand, if the other spheres are dominated by the political 
community or the state, that might suggest an open door to nationalism or fascism.
The political community, according to Durkheim’s normative understanding of it, 
encompasses a plurality of secondary groups without becoming one itself. It includes 
all without being dominated by any. In Durkheim’s idiom, the political community 
and the state are not the same. The state refers to “the agents of the sovereign 
authority,” while the political community refers a shared public space which includes 
all secondary groups. Far from being in radical opposition to the various secondary 
groups contained within the political sphere, Durkheim contends that “the state 
presupposes their existence... No secondary groups, no political authority, at least 
no authority which can legitimately be called political.” (Durkheim, 1992, p. 45) In his 
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lectures on professional ethics and civic morals, Durkheim championed a model of 
the state that is neither laissez-faire liberal nor nationalistic. The state, if legitimately 
representing the ideals and goals of the democratic political community, supports 
moral individualism and pluralism.
There is a dialectical relation between the state and its plural secondary groups. 
From this dialectic, in Durkheim’s view, emerges the social solidarity of the political 
community, and such solidarity, in turn, sustains the dialectic. Solidarity is not the 
result of state sponsored coercion, nor of a natural harmony among secondary 
groups. Rather, it emerges from, and contributes to, the dialectical relation between 
the democratic state and its various secondary groups. Solidarity of the political 
community, then, does not work against pluralism, but rather is constitutive of its 
very existence. And the health of the political community requires a rich variety of 
secondary groups. Unlike Rousseau who feared secondary groups, Durkheim did 
not support the Social Contract model of the state in which diverse individuals have 
a direct relation to the state, but not to each other. Not only did Durkheim not fear 
secondary groups and the pluralism that they represent, but he defended their vital 
role in providing a variety of moral homes for individuals and in contributing diversity 
and dynamism to the political community.
What is the relation between the solidarity of the democratic nation-state and 
what some call the global community or village? Did Durkheim have a position on 
globalization or on the possibility of a social sphere larger than the nation’s political 
community? Durkheim maintained that there is an international sphere that, in 
a limited sense, encompasses the political community. The political community, 
according to Durkheim, has no sovereign above it except that of the state. This 
sovereign, however, is relative and needs to be qualified. It is accountable to 
the political community, and Durkheim also insisted that it is also accountable 
to the international community (Durkheim, 1915). In Elementary Forms Durkheim 
claimed that
… there is no people, no state that is not involved with another society that is 
more or less unlimited and includes all peoples, or states with which they are 
directly or indirectly in contact. There is no national life that is not dominated 
by an inherently international collective life. As we go forward in history, these 
international groupings take on greater importance and scope. (Durkheim, 
2001, pp. 321–322)
Durkheim provided two different yet related accounts for the rise of what could 
be called global ethics. In one account, global ethics emerges from the recognition 
of duties that apply to all individuals, regardless of national boundaries. In his 
lectures on professional ethics and civic morals, he claimed that there are “duties 
independent of any particular grouping... This is the most general sphere in the 
whole of ethics, for it is independent of any local or ethnic conditions.” (Durkheim, 
1992, p. 110) These duties pertain to protecting the rights and dignity of humans –  for 
example, protection from cruel humiliation, mutilation, murder, or theft.
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The second account is closely related to the first, for it is a sociohistorical 
explanation for the development of international human rights. He claimed that 
“the group no longer seems to have value in itself and for itself: it is only a means 
of fulfilling and developing human nature to the point demanded by the current 
ideals.” (Ibid., p. 112) For example, increasingly nations justify their existence by 
their efforts to protect individuals from unnecessary suffering –  “a hateful thing” – 
as opposed to in the past when the nation –  a personification of God or the sacred – 
was the object of highest regard. Durkheim claimed that increased pluralism 
accounts for this transfer of sacred regard from the pride of the individual nation to 
the dignity of the individual –  wherever she or he lives. He wrote, “with the increase 
of diversity among the members of all societies, there is no essential characteristic 
in common except those derived from the basic quality of their human nature. 
It is this quality that quite naturally becomes the supreme object of collective 
sensibility.” (Ibid., p. 112)
We have already seen this logic in Durkheim’s communitarian defense of moral 
individualism: our shared understanding is centered on the dignity and rights of the 
individual. Now, however, Durkheim has taken this logic from a national to a global 
level. Given the high level of human diversity in the international realm, shared beliefs 
and practices are thin, except for the overlapping commitment to the global ethic of 
human rights. Durkheim’s prediction is that as members of diverse nations associate 
and work on common issues, international ethics will become more substantive. 
Increasingly, “national aims do not lie at the summit of the [moral] hierarchy –  it is 
human aims that are destined to be supreme.” (Ibid., p. 73)
Yet Durkheim was not entirely sanguine about what we today call globalization. 
He feared anomie on an international scale as the global economy increasingly 
sought the maximization of profit above all else. He noted that what might look like 
a promising “world state” may in fact turn out to be but another form of “egoistic 
individualism.” (Ibid., p. 74) His worry was that unregulated concentrations of 
power would subvert the sovereignty of citizens and their ability to work for 
normative domestic and global aims. Durkheim, of course, knew nothing about the 
environmental costs of a global economy unleashed from normative beliefs and 
practices. Yet he did anticipate the social harm and suffering that would flow from 
a global economy modeled on anomic, national economies.
Does Durkheim’s suggestion for how democratic moral reasoning can govern 
national economies apply to today’s global economy? A Durkheimian approach to 
economic globalization would require a modified version of Durkheim’s complex 
normative account of the dialectical relation among the state, secondary groups, 
and individuals. The revised Durkheimian model would entail an augmented 
dialectic that included the global realm more robustly. In this model, the democratic 
nation would attempt to foster within the nation-state a social order that properly 
arranges and regards the domains of local community, the wider civic community, 
and global institutions.
Durkheim held that if global justice is to be achieved, nation-states and local 
communities need to cultivate in their members a commitment to global, moral 
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issues. Hence Durkheim claimed that the way to avoid a clash between national and 
global perspectives is for “each state to have as its chief aim... to set its own house 
in order and to make the widest appeal to its members for a moral life on an ever 
higher level... If the state had no other purpose than making humans of its citizens, in 
the widest sense of the term, then civic duties would be only a particular form of the 
general obligations of humanity.” (Ibid., p. 74)
Global justice, then, requires just states, and just states require sufficient 
solidarity to work jointly toward the common aims of justice at the local, national, 
and global level. The Durkheimian lesson is that if we want to achieve social and 
economic justice, whether we are living among domestic or global diversity, we must 
remain committed to some form of solidarity. To neglect solidarity is to risk having 
our most cherished ideals, including the celebration of diversity, drained of their 
capacity to shape our lives, institutions, and communities.
4. Religion, solidarity, and environmental degradation
Consider the following state of affairs: calculated conservatively, the extinction 
rate of mammals is now 1,000 times greater than during the last great age of 
extinction, the ice ages of the Pleistocene epoch (Ehrenfeld, 1993, p. 180); 
between 1900 and 1965, one half of the forests in developing countries was 
cleared for log export and for cattle grazing to supply the U.S. hamburger industry, 
and such logging is not slowing down (Khor, 1996, p. 52); tropical forests are 
being destroyed at the rate of 168,000 square kilometers per year (Goodland, 
1996, p. 214). Although there is disagreement on the exact numbers, few fail 
to concede that, due to contemporary economic and industrial practices, we 
are witnessing an unprecedented loss of wetlands, crop diversity, top soil, and 
fisheries. Such catastrophic losses are matched by the inordinate pollution of the 
air, water, and land from the massive use of fossil fuels, ozone depleting gases, 
herbicides, pesticides, industrial chemicals, and heavy metals, among other 
toxicities. This is a short list of the material and tangible dangers that threaten 
those who, having forgotten about the basic sources of life, are cutting, polluting, 
and despoiling the frail ecological systems that sustain human existence.
There is a clear correlation between accelerated environmental 
degradation and the increased power and wealth of transnational corporations. 
With little or no concern for the health of local areas but rather for maximizing 
profits, transnational corporations are usually indifferent to, and sometimes 
contemptuous of, environmental considerations. The entire food production 
and distribution system has become dependent on heavy usage of fossil fuels 
and agricultural chemicals –  pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers –  and such 
usage is devastating the planet’s ecosystems. Few believe these practices 
are sustainable. Yet the global agri-food industrial complex is increasingly 
operating without government supervision, without citizen consent, without 
assurances to protect the environment. These are some of the challenges that 
face the globe today.
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4.1 Religion and solidarity: double-edged swords
What do religion and solidarity have to do with environmental degradation? Religion 
and social solidarity have both combated environmental degradation and have 
contributed to it. Such world religions as Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, 
and Islam have fostered wise, sustainable environmental practices; but they have 
also at times (or even at “the same time”) undermined such wise practices. The 
relation between religion and the environment is a complicated topic.
The relation between solidarity and environmental practices is equally 
complicated. Social solidarity has been at the root of many strong and helpful 
environmental movements today. But forms of social solidarity have also brought 
much environmental destruction. The determination to build dams, develop and 
use chemical pesticides, construct coal-fire and nuclear power plants, build 
fleets of cars –  such developments often require great collective resolve. Although 
such developments are not necessarily socially irresponsible, they do often lead 
to problematic environmental outcomes. And in any case, these developments 
require much collective commitment –  social solidarity –  to be achieved. In many 
contemporary cases, social solidarity is not homogenous, and we find one segment 
of a population committed to environmentally sustainable practices and another 
segment working toward unbridled economic growth –  the kind of growth that may 
raise the “standard of living” while simultaneously causing great environmental 
destruction. So once again, the relation between solidarity and environmental 
practices is a complex one.
For the remainder of this essay, I will focus on religion and the environment. 
It should be kept in mind that, most of the time, religions generate strong solidarity, 
and hence much of what I have to say about religion and the environment could 
equally apply to a discussion about solidarity and the environment.
In my research, I have found evidence that religious commitment that pertains to 
environmentalism can serve as an occasion for individuals to experience a deepened 
private life and a more participatory public life. I have analytically organized this 
evidence –  based on social scientific studies, social and political theory, religious 
studies, and personal interviews –  into four categories that represent public and private 
religious responses to the environmental crisis. The four categories are as follows:
1) Environmentalism as Religion. In many ways, contemporary environmental 
groups and ecological movements function as a form of religion. That is, sociologically 
speaking, much contemporary environmentalism exhibits characteristics of religion. 
There are, for example, a host of environmental groups, such as the Sierra Club, 
Greenpeace, or Earth First! that can be said to function (from a sociological point of 
view) as religions. These groups offer a robust vision or way of life that can transform 
their members’ lives.
2) Theological Perspectives on the Environment. This second category 
pertains to the relation between a religious tradition’s beliefs and its perspectives on 
the natural world. Christianity and Buddhism, for example, have distinctive religious 
depictions of creation, nature, and the position of humans in the natural world.
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3) Organized Religion and Eco-activism. Closely related to the second 
category, this third category pertains to the relation between religious belief 
and social practice. Many traditional and new religious groups –  churches and 
synagogues, mosques and temples, Wiccan and other new religious movements – 
are actively engaged in environmental issues. From involvement in environmental 
justice to sustainable agriculture to active lobbying, many religious communities 
are evincing deep environmental commitments. This development has led to the 
creation of such new organizations as the North American Coalition on Religion and 
Ecology, the National Religious Partnership on the Environment, and the Coalition 
on the Environment and Jewish Life. It has also animated a wide range of existing 
religious organizations –  from Christian churches to Jewish synagogues to Buddhist 
retreat centers.
4) Private Spirituality and Nature. In nature writers such as Annie Dillard 
and Barry Lopez, in religious authors such as Thomas Berry and Terry Tempest 
Williams, and more generally in popular culture, there is a growing regard for what 
can be called the sacred sense of nature. This spirituality of nature tends not to be 
tied to particular religious traditions, although it is compatible with most of them. 
It may not be formulated in traditionally theological ways. But there is something 
traditional about the religious vocabulary that is employed to describe encounters 
with nature –  concepts like healing, wonder, awe, enchantment, transcendence, 
reverence, immortal beauty, silence, bowing, witnessing, and mystery. There is often 
a connection between this spirituality of nature –  the sacralization of the secular – 
and heightened civic participation at both local and national levels.
These categories represent opportunities for enhanced commitment to, and 
affection for, joining together and fostering the social, economic, and natural 
landscapes that sustain us. However, as I have said, religion can also promote 
destructive environmental practices.
5. Concluding comments
“Solidarity, religion and the environment” –  these three separate yet related 
topics together form both a promise and a challenge. The challenge is how solidarity 
and religion can contribute to wise social, economic, and environmental practices 
for the planet. The promise is the collective strength and wisdom that solidarity and 
religion potentially offer us as we struggle with twenty-first century challenges.
In this article, I have attempted to do several things:
• I have argued that religion and solidarity should not be treated as anomalies 
in modernity, and that both religion and solidarity continue to play a significant role 
in local and global events; indeed, social solidarity remains an essential condition 
for addressing many problems that confront the globe today, including social justice 
and environmental degradation.
• Drawing mainly on the work of Durkheim, I have attempted to show the role 
solidarity plays in establishing individual rights (moral individualism), moral pluralism, 
and moral education.
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• Still drawing on Durkheim, I illustrated the relation between solidarity and 
economic justice, political community, and globalization.
• Lastly, I attempted to outline the relation among religion, solidarity, and 
environmental degradation.
Envisioning alternatives to disturbing current global trends may appear to 
be an exercise in quixotic thought. Yet I firmly believe that quixotic is the view 
that there are no ecological limits to an extractive economy that fuels exorbitant 
production and anomic consumption. Fatalism, the belief that the worst aspects 
of globalization are inevitable, is not an especially reasonable position. Hope is 
more sensible, if only because it is more likely to bring the needful changes that 
are becoming increasingly conspicuous. This logic of hope applies to the other 
concerns I have raised in this article pertaining to social and economic justice. 
More and more people are recognizing that social and ecological dangers will 
persist and grow if local populations and global organizations to not work for 
healthy change. But in order to begin the work of change, one must hope for change. 
Those who care about a place will do much to protect it, and in the process they 
will experience the joy of working together with others, and their love of place and 
fellows will grow still more. My hope is that such affections are contagious. This is 
solidarity at its best. This is religion at its best.
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